Battleground analysis: Colorado

Continuing with our analysis of the election-determining battlegrounds of Virginia, Colorado and Ohio, we'll take a look at how they relate to some of the different elements of strategy on a case by case basis. I'll be updating this analysis post-debates/final voter registration numbers. And now, the Centennial State.

2004 result
Bush: 1,101,255 votes
Kerry: 1,001,732 votes
Democratic deficit: 99,523 votes

Polling
The best Colorado polling is done by the Rocky Mountain News and the average of Rasmussen, PPP and Quinnipiac.

Current polling has it as follows:



New registrants
As of the end of July, GOP registered voters stood at 1,024,504 to 946,277. What is crucial here is the trendline:


The mid-October final registrant numbers will be fascinating and I'll update this again then.

Ground game
Obama has 32 field offices to McCain's 11. 538 has chronicled field organising efforts on Colorado in Durango/Cortez, Grand Junction, Colorado Springs, Boulder and Denver.

Advertising
Per the well respected Wisconsin Advertising Project McCain edges Obama in advertising by $553,000 to $522,000 per week.

Issues
Water statewide, gun rights outside of Denver and Boulder.

Candidate visits
Since the Colorado primaries Obama has visited 6 times whilst McCain has visited 7 times. Although it should be noted that one of Obama's visits was the Convention.

Othe factors
Governor Bill Ritter (D), Secretary of State Mike Coffman (R).

Best CO coverage
The Field, 538

Demographics
The 2004 network exit poll for Colorado revealed the following demographic breakdown of the CO electorate:

Female: 56%
Male: 44%
White: 86%
African American: 4%
Hispanic: 8% (estimated 2008 increase: 10%)
Other: 3%
Ages:
Under 30: 15% (estimated 2008 increase: 17%)
31-64: 69% (estimated 2008 increase: 67%)
Over 65: 16%

Since 2000, Colorado has seen impressive increases in the Hispanic population and in the Hispanic electorate (with the Hispanic population in the GOP stronghold of Colorado Springs growing since by over 40%!).

Party ID 2004
Democratic: 29%
Republican: 38%
Independent: 33%

No exit poll data from the 2006 elections is available.

Party ID 2008 estimate:
Democratic: 35%
Republican: 37%
Independent: 28%

Geography
Obama strongholds: Boulder, Denver
McCain strongholds: Colorado Springs
Key clash: Cortez

Conclusion
Paired with Virginia, Colorado is one of Obama's best routes to 270 electoral votes (Ohio, as we will see shortly, lags some way behind).

“Changing the makeup of the electorate is key to changing the outcome of the election’’ says Robert Gibbs, a senior Obama staffer. The campaign is targeting Independents in Colorado’s suburbs, Latinos in the southern part of the state, and voters in Republican-dominated areas most Democratic candidates write off. Given the likelihood of a slight GOP superiority in Likely Voter terms come Nov 4, Independents will be key to the election. As such Obama's months long voter outreach effort, plus the benefits of the Convention will prove powerful advantages.

After the voter registration deadline (Oct 6) I'll post an update on CO's state of play.

Ultimately, Colorado is another toss-up that I feel will ultimately break for Obama.

McCain’s Amazing Strategy-less Campaign

Politics lends itself to hypocrisy. I am not issuing a condemnation, merely noting a phenomenon. Candidates routinely castigate one another for judgment calls they themselves would have made – it’s simply the nature of the game. Occasionally, however, a pot-and-kettle moment of particular brilliance arrests our attention, and such a moment occurred during the first debate on Friday when McCain accused Obama of not knowing the difference between strategy and tactics.

In the interest of full disclosure, it’s worth noting that that distinction is very close to our hearts here at VomPolitik. In fact, we talk of little else, really. It has been with particular relish that we’ve watched the professional military take McCain to task for being guilty of that same lack of understanding with regard to Iraq, as per Marcus’s post above. I will leave that particular job in their capable hands, and proceed to a wider context, which is that I am now convinced that the McCain campaign is and has been operating in the complete absence of any coherent strategy whatsoever.

My last entry emphasized the importance of seizing the Change mantle during a Change year. Earlier this year, McCain was faced with the same choice that confronted Hillary Clinton: try to win as an Establishment/Experience candidate in a Change year, or try to co-opt Change from Obama.

In this McCain had an odd advantage, in that he could genuinely have gone either way. His long DC career lends itself to the Experience line, but his Senate record is one in which, from a Change perspective, the parts are actually stronger than the whole. Obama can talk about McCain having voted with and for the Bush agenda 95% of the time; McCain could very easily counter with his castigation of Don Rumsfeld, his opposition to Bush on torture, his work in campaign finance reform, his bipartisan efforts in immigration, etc., and claim that he’s actually the voice of Change. As with HRC, it would have been a difficult sell, but not impossible.

McCain went with the Experience line, a decision that could be considered surprising for two reasons – he had just watched Hillary Clinton fail in an attempt to run as the Experience candidate in a Change year, and, more incredibly by far, he had himself been gearing up to run as the Change candidate.

All summer McCain hit the Experience line hard and kept it well in reach, until he pulled what he appeared to be an about-face with the selection of Sarah Palin to be his running mate. A big Dem donor told me then, “he’s making a play for the change title,” and that seemed to be the consensus opinion, further bolstered by her frequent references to ‘reform’ in her acceptance speech (not to mention the rather clever line about some candidates using change to promote their careers while John McCain used his career to promote change), and McCain’s use of the word ‘change’ 11 times in his own. Change, it seemed, was in fashion in the McCain campaign.

Except when it wasn’t. One of the McCain campaigns earliest ads for Palin is a schizophrenic attack on Obama’s experience as change agent via Palin’s executive experience. She was then set to attack Obama’s liberalism, red-meat to dedicated Republicans but not much good for the Change narrative. ‘Change’ left McCain’s own vocabulary rather abruptly. Now Sarah Palin’s capacity as an agent of the ‘Change’ mantra has been rather damaged by her apparent inability to utter a single talking point without mangling it.

McCain, meanwhile, had a golden earned-media opportunity on Friday night. Even at this comparatively late date, he could have gone a long way toward grasping the Change mantle by using the Friday debate to talk about his commitment to Change, particularly during the opening discussion on the economy, perhaps the subject ripest for talk of a new direction. Instead, he chose to belabor the point about earmarks, and then, playing the ultimate card in his Experience deck, castigated Obama for his lack of experience in foreign affairs (including the criticism that led to this post).

Strategy in politics isn’t just about message, though. It is, among other things, about using the candidate’s time well in pursuing a coordinated campaign to win critical states. In this, too, the McCain campaign has been suspect. In their first joint appearance after the convention, McCain and Palin appeared in Wisconsin, a state in which Obama enjoys a lead and which last voted Republican in 1984. Today, McCain appeared in Iowa, a state in which he trails by nine points, on the heels of condemning ethanol on Friday. What can he imagine he’ll accomplish there?

To sum up: McCain runs on the Experience platform, even though his campaign had clearly gamed out a Change run. He picks a female VP, a Change move. She talks Change. He talks Change. Then they both stop talking Change. Now she’s the attack dog and he back on Experience. Meanwhile, he periodically visits states not in play.

And it is Obama, apparently, who doesn’t understand strategy.

Strategy & Tactics

Perhaps it was just me, but I was thrilled by the fact that the potential Commanders-in-Chief gave us the benefit of their insight on the difference between strategy and tactics.

As for whose understanding passes muster, I suppose we should have known something was amiss when McCain at the outset of the debate incorrectly invoked the great Clausewitzian General Eisenhower (a man who, per my old War Studies tutor, read 'Vom Krieg' at least three times) but that was just the start. Here's their exchange:

Obama: "They (US forces) have done a brilliant job, and General Petraeus has done a brilliant job. But understand, that was a tactic designed to contain the damage of the previous four years of mismanagement of this war."
...
McCain: "I'm afraid Senator Obama doesn't understand the difference between a tactic and a strategy."

McCain's response came in for particular critiscim by Col. Gerald A. Lechliter (ret.) who wrote:

"I'm a retired (1999) Army colonel and was astounded by McCain's confusion about military "strategy" during the debate. I listened to it and then read the applicable area in the transcript. Either he was using language extremely carelessly or he didn't learn some basics in his military career. He was a Navy captain who attended, I believe, the National War College and national security is supposedly his strong suit. It should be second nature. "

Personally, I think Luttwak's levels of strategy (technical, tactical, operational, theatre strategic, grand strategic) are helpful in making this differentiation. The essential problem between McCain and Obama is that the Surge was neither a tactic nor a strategy: it was an operation that contained within it tactics and was in turn in service of a strategy.

All this and James Fallows offering a Clausewitz/Palin comparison - it really was a bumper weekend for On Politik!

Battleground analysis: Virginia

Having reviewed the battlegrounds overall it is helpful to consider them as they relate to some of the different elements of strategy on a case by case basis. Thus I'll be offering thoughts on what I consider the crucial states of VA, CO, OH, FL and NV. After the debates and with the close of early voting in mid-October we'll review the state of play in these key states once again.

2004 result
Bush: 1,716,959 votes
Kerry: 1,454,742 votes
Democratic deficit: 262,217 votes

Polling
The best Virginia poll in the Democratic Primary was Survey USA.
Current polling has it as follows:

New registrants
Team Obama aims to register 300,000 new voters in VA and as such intends to secure 135,000 bonus votes from voter registration operations (based upon a calculus of 80% of new registrants breaking for Obama and 75% of those new registrants actually voting).

Ground game
Ultimately, the trench warfare of the ground game need sto be executed near perfectly for Obama to win but with 28 field offices to McCain's 6 I feel confident of Team Obama's capabilities in this respect.

Advertising
Per the well respected Wisconsin Advertising Project Obama outspends McCain in advertising by an astonishing $868,000 to $312,000 per week.
Issues
National Security for voters in Hampton Roads (big Veterans population), Economy elsewhere.

Candidate visits
Since the Virginia Primaries, Obama has visited the state 14 times whilst McCain has visited the state only 7 times.

Othe factors
Governor Tim Kaine (D), Secretary of State Katherine Hanley (D), Fmr. Gov. Mark Warner has a lock on the open VA Senate seat and a remarkable popularity rating.

Best VA coverage
The Field, 538, Washington Post, Raising Kaine, the National Review(!), The New Yorker

Demographics
The 2004 network exit poll for Virginia revealed the following demographic breakdown of the VA electorate:

Female: 54%
Male: 46%
White: 72% (estimated 2008 decrease: 71%)
African American: 21% (estimated 2008 increase: 22%)
Hispanic: 3%
Other: 4%
Ages:
Under 30: 17% (estimated 2008 increase: 18%)
31-64: 73% (estimated 2008 increase: 72%)
Over 65: 10%

Party ID

Party ID 2004:
Democratic: 39%
Republican: 35%
Independent: 26%

Party ID 2006:
Democratic: 36%
Republican: 39%
Independent: 26%

Party ID 2008 estimate:
Democratic: 38%
Republican: 37%
Independent: 25%

Geography
Obama strongholds: Northern Virginia
McCain strongholds: Southern Virginia
Key clash: Hampton Roads

Per Chuck Todd: "To see the difference between winning and losing in the Old Dominion, check out these numbers in the poll: Obama wins Northern Virginia by a 55%-37% margin, while McCain wins the crucial Hampton Roads area by 48%-44%. But in the recent Washington Post/ABC survey, which had Obama leading in Virginia by three points among likely voters, Obama was at 59% in Northern Virginia and was up 50%-45% in Hampton Roads. This tells you that if Obama does get to 60% in NoVa, he just might win the state even if he loses every other region. But Hampton Roads may very well be the ballgame in the state."

Conclusion
Virginia is one of Obama's best routes to 270 (certainly superior to Ohio). Winning will require Obama to dominate in the North with whilst curtailing his losses in the South through a combination of youth and minority tunout and a heavy emphasis on newly registered voters and early voting. Tom Jensen of PPP reckons that such a scenario could deliver an Obama victory in VA with just 39% of the white vote. As such Jensen posits, Obama only needs 1/3rd of undecided voters to break his way whilst demographics and GOTV carries him to victory.

After the voter registration deadline (Oct 4) I'll post an update on VA's state of play.

This is a Toss-up state liekly to the end but if you put me ona razor sharp fence I'd say: Obama.

Am live Twittering the debate

http://twitter.com/vompolitik

The greatest game in the world, played for the highest stakes imaginable

Watching Harry Reid shred McCain a few minutes ago, I'm reminded of how useful an ally to Obama he is right now and am proud of my fellow Edinburgh Tatoo fan:

Meanwhile, word is that the new Dem plan includes a $7.5 billion down payment on $25 billion in loans for the struggling auto industry. Looks like the Dems are indeed adopting some of my ideas from yesterday's post!

I'm Twittering the crisis throughout the day.

Politik and the current crisis

As both the political cognoscenti and even David Letterman turn on McCain's move, Obama's eminently sensible principles (which the McCain campaign rejected for inclusion in the otherwise totally saccharine joint statement) seem the logical way to proceed from a strictly policy-minded perspective:

1) Oversight
2) Taxpayer refund/profit
3) No Govt welfare for CEO greed
4) Foreclosure relief for families
5) No earmarks

Also included should be Senator Schumer's too-sensible-to-be-true idea of handing the money over in tranches, so we're "only" $150bn down for now and the next President can review the situation. And I like the Clintons' idea of "a moratorium on home foreclosures for 60 to 90 days so that they could all be reviewed."

But wait, is McCain preparing to vote no? Even as his Veep warns we're on the brink of another Great Depression? Even as he himself says this is "the most serious crisis since the end of World War II" (and you thought Korean War, the Cuban Missile Crisis and Vietnam were bad)?

Now, far be it for this blog to see some kind of inter-relationship between politics and policy but if Obama wants to respond in kind to McCain's injection of politics into policy then there's a one word way of doing so:

Earmarks.

Oh how McCain hates them. So, dump your fifth principle Barack and add the following to the bill:

• provisions for job training schemes in MI, OH, PA and IN to deal with the 7 year high in unemployment
• Congressional protection of CO water rights against Arizonan encroachment
  
• a bailout for the automotive industry in MI
  
• a massive expansion of veterans support in VA
• protection for FL seniors' prescription drug coverage
  

The markets recover. Voters love it. McCain is forced to vote no and becomes both irrelevant and unpopular. Now, Obama won't do it, but I bet LBJ would have.

McCain's latest dice throw...

"How bad must it be when you decide that you are better off not even campaigning for President?" - Frank Spring

Say what you like about Team McCain, they certainly know how to shake things up. From Britney/Paris ads to picking Palin to 'taking command' of the economic crisis.

Why's he doing this:

• Polls, polls, polls. As Ben Smith said: "But in terms of the timing of this move: The only thing that's changed in the last 48 hours is the public polling."
• McCain hasn't been doing debate prep properly this week (NYC:WTF?), whilst Obama has been on near lockdown.
• The economic crisis even led Obama to stage a polling comeback on his ability to handle a crisis.

In the short term, this will probbaly play to McCain's favour - allowing him to appear commanding on the crisis. Team Obama could call him out for playing politics but that seems hard given that they were the ones who first wanted a joint-response this morning. Long term, the crisis has reminded voters that the economy is the number 1 issue: that benefits the Democratic candidate, not the Republican one.

Does that mean that Obama should accept delaying the debate? I think not. Instead, Obama should accept a 24hr suspension, fly back to DC, negotiate a deal by lunchtime tommorow and do the debate Friday.

The state of the race post-Convention, pre-debates

Given that there are now 42 days to go, now seems the perfect time to consider the state of the race strategically. Armed with data from polls, news reports and endless hours of vexed Subway-riding thought (not to mention the better judgement of John, Frank, Matt and Mark) here's my assessment of where things stand from candidates to voting groups.

Candidates: Voters vote for the top of the ticket, not the running mates. As this reality has reasserted itself, the Obama/McCain match-up became paramount in voters minds. Obama needs to keep it that way and not get sucked into another Obama versus Palin fight.

Veeps: Voters vote for the top of the ticket, not the running mates - except when they don't. Palin has fired up the GOP base, but hasn't made the kind of breakthrough with Inds and white women she needed to to have a significant effect in the battleground states. In fact, she may even have hurt McCain in Virginia (per PPP) and in Florida (per the Miami Herald) where the contrast to Joe Biden (nice, safe, white male that he is - grrr) seems to have been rather negative.

Message: McCain's message keeps changing (pre-Palin, emphasising C-in-C readiness and overall experience and now (post-Palin) change. As Obama campaign manager David Plouffe noted with the Palin pick at the time: “John McCain jettisoned his message and his strategy. It is now about change. We’re going to lean into that very, very hard.” Add to this the McCain campaign's inconsistent lines of attack in TV ads and there is mounting evidence that the McCain campaign is running a war room rather then pursuing a strategy.

Issues matter: Contra Rick Davis' wishes, the turn away from 'Lipstick on pigs' nonsense was as welcome to the Obama campaign as it was inevitable. With the upcoming debates helping to focus the media's attention on matters of foreign policy (debate I), domestic issues (debate II) and the economy (debate III) this should be a net Obama advantage.

Conventions: For the Democrats, Obama shifted direction from appealing to the centre ground, to solidifying his support amongst Democrats. The Biden pick played into this approach in a way that Sebelius would not. Despite my crush on the Girl from Kansas, this is a logical electoral approach given that if Obama can simply carry 85% of registered Democrats in Ohio he almost certainly carries the state (he is currently winning 77% of Dems per the latest SUSA poll). McCain meanwhile used his Convention to lock up his base through the Palin pick. As such, as this Gallup data makes clear, the Conventions both fulfilled their task of enhancing party loyalty, reducing the number of undecideds and laying the groundwork for the final push: a base versus base clash remarkably similar to that of 2004.

Debates: Even though they tend to move less the 1% of the polls, the attention paid to them (potentially 100mn viewers this year) and the possibility that they might move more then 2% makes this the focus of the candidates and the medias world for the next 3 weeks. The Atlantic's James Fallows offers a first class essay on the candidates debating styles based on a review of all 47 of their primary debate performances. 538 offers further analysis of the debate bounce history.

Source: Tom Holbrook, Election08data

The October Surprise: Much feared by the the poll leader after the debates this is the last remaining major event of the campaign calender. The media will annoit a major news story the 'October Surprise' and campaigns' reactions to it will be judged critically. Previous surprises have included Bush's 1976 Driving-Under-the-Influence charge in the 2000 election and the bin Laden video of 2004.

Bounces: As 538 correctly predicted, conventions give bounces and those bounces diminish over time. The Palin/GOP Convention bounce has now receded and the election is pretty much back to where it was poll-wise prior to the Dems' successful 'Party Unity' party and the GOP's seemingly successful 'Hail Sarah' pass.

Source: Nate Silver, 538.

Ground game: In Florida alone Obama is reckoned to have between over 50 field offices, 300-350 paid staff and 100,000 volunteers in the Sunshine state. This summary of field office numbers across the states is a little dated, but the fundemental concept of a significant (perhaps even 3:1) Obama:McCain field office advantage likely remains. Overall, Obama last month spent twice as much on staff as McCain did, due to the size of his ground staff payroll cost.

Fundraising:
It's important to remember that the crucial comparison here is RNC $ + McCain $ versus DNC $ + Obama $. With McCain now taking public financing ($84mn between the GOP Convention and Nov 4) this is the current state of play in terms of campaign money, National Committee money and the all-important cash-on-hand:

July:
RNC ($26mn) + McCain ($27mn) = $53mn
DNC ($27mn) + Obama ($51mn) = $78mn

August:
RNC ($30.5mn*) + McCain ($53.2mn) = $83.7mn
DNC ($39.4mn) + Obama ($67.5mn) = $106.9mn

Cash-On-Hand as of the Aug 31:
RNC ($76.5mn) + McCain ($27mn) + Public funding ($84.1mn) = $187.6mn
DNC ($17.7mn) + Obama ($77.4mn) = $95.1mn

* = as extrapolated from CQ Politics based on RNC August cash-on-hand minus July RNC cash-on-hand + RNC August spending = August RNC fundraising

A note about the oft-stated concern that Obama is losing valuable time on the campaign trail by his decision to forego public financing whilst McCain is free to campaign with impunity. McCain too is heavily engaged in fundraising for the RNC and so the comparison in terms of lost time is a relative one, not an absolute one.

Conclusion: The RNC + McCain is estimated to have between $224 million and $240 million to spend in September, October and November - including public financing money. Set against this, if the Obama campaign simply raises as much in September and October as it did in August then the comparison looks pretty favourable:

Obama/DNC Sept. ($106.9mn) + Obama/DNC Oct. ($106.9mn) + Obama/DNC cash-on-hand ($95.1mn) = $308.9mn

RNC projection Sept. & Oct. ($100mn) + McCain/RNC cash-on-hand ($187.6mn) = $287.6mn

The female vote: With African Americans, hispanics and young voters breaking for Obama and white males and seniors breaking for McCain, the key remaining demographic appears to be women. Historically, Dems have seen support slipping amongst this once mainstay of the Party: Clinton carried women in general 16%, Gore by 11% and Kerry by 4%. Looking at Survey USA crosstabs, polls that have Obama up tend to have him winning the women's vote, polls that have him down amongst women, tend to have him down on the poll overall.

Independents: Continue to be split more or less 50/50. Gallup offers great data in support of the following contentions : In whatever direction prevailing political wind has blown, Ind's have allowed themselves be carried in that direction. As such, when Obama was basking in the glory of his overseas trip, they broke for him, when the GOP Convention/Palin bounce was the flavour dujour that was what tickled their fancy then. Alas, it looks like my earlier hope that they would turn against McCain because of Palin's inexperience has not actually occured. (Have I mentioned how annoying these people are from a statistical modelling perspective?) Thus I posit that if Obama wins the last major news event (either the final debate on Oct 15 or a subsequent October Surprise then he will carry Independents on Nov. 4.

Undecideds: 538 offers some excellent prediction on the way Undecideds may break based on the Democratic primaries. Set against this, Chuck Todd has frequently suggested on MSNBC that they may very well break 70% against Obama. Like Independents they are likely highly influenced by late-breaking developments such as the debates or a possible October Surprise. As such, I believe that the 4-6% of actual undecided voters that remain in play in battleground states will probably break against Obama but that this number may very well be matched if not overcome by new voters from pro-Obama constituences.

Battlegrounds: In late June, David Plouffe listed the campaign's 18 battleground targets as: Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Michigan, Iowa, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Virginia. Per my latest map, of these 18, 14 are still in active contention with Alaska, North Dakota and Georgia moving off the table for Obama and Iowa moving out of McCain's reach. Of these 14, 10 are 'Red states' (states carried by Bush in 2004) - testament to the wisdom of a full embrace of strategic depth on the battleground states map.

The Battleground Map (22 Sept. 2008)

Having studied the map on a demographic and party ID basis I've "reassessed"* the battleground landscape. Firstly, here's what Chuck Todd's gang thinks the state of play is this week:

First Read:
Likely Obama: CA, CT, DE, DC, HI, IL, ME, MD, MA, NJ, NY, RI, VT (157 electoral votes)
Lean Obama: IA, MN, NJ, NM OR, PA, WA (76 votes)
Toss-up: CO, MI, NV, NH, OH, VA, WI (78 votes)
Lean McCain: FL, IN, MO, MT, NC (67 votes)
Likely McCain: AL, AK, AZ, AR, GA, ID, KS, KY, LA, MS, NE, ND, OK, SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, WV, WY (160 votes)

And here's my new map:

MAR:
Likely Obama: CA, CT, DE, DC, HI, IA, IL, ME, MD, MA, MN, NJ, NY, OR, RI, VT, WA (207 electoral votes)
Lean Obama: WI, MI, NM, PA (53 votes)
Toss-up: CO, MT, NV, NE-cd2 (1ev), NH, OH, VA (55 votes)
Lean McCain: FL, IN, MO, NC, (64 votes)
Likely McCain: AK, AL, AZ, AR, GA, ID, KS, KY, LA, MS, ND, NE (4evs), OK, SC, SD, TN, TX, UT, WV, WY (159 votes)

State-by-state:

• MI looks to be for McCain what NC is for Obama - so temptingly close but seemingly forever just a fingernail away. As such, the Wolverine state moves (just) to Obama's side.
• PA could move into Toss-up but as long as Obama can retain the lead even when facing a party (dis)loyalty factor of just 72% it his territory.
• MT moves from Toss-up (where Pollster.com still has it) to Lean McCain. All it would take to go back to Toss-up is just one good poll for Obama there though.
• NE-cd2 moves from Lean Obama to Toss-up as my heart bows to my head and I await some actual data from the district before deciding how the critical 1 EV might actually go.
• NH is still Toss-up (on the basis of the only two post Convention polls being conducted by the idiots at ARG and Zogby Interactive) - real data for NH is desperately needed. Look to see NH become Lean Obama soon.
• The temptation to make IN Toss-up is huge, especially after my favourite pollster Ann Seltzer had Obama up 3, given it's ruby red history though I'll be more conservative then my heart desires and keep it as Lean McCain for now.
• FL also teeters on the brink of being a toss-up but a good poll with Obama out in front is needed to push it into the coin-flip category.
• MO remains a Lean McCain, but I imagine it will move to Likely McCain if and when Obama pulls out (probably transferring the staff to IN and OH).
• NC remains in Lean McCain but should be moving to Toss-up as soon as a credible poll has Obama out in front there.
• ND goes from Toss-up to Likely McCain - a huge shift due first to my state analysis of the demographics and party ID numbers and then confirmed by the news that Team Obama is pulling out of the Peace Garden State.
• GA now moves from Lean McCain to Likely McCain as we likely say goodbye to the: win 31%+ of whites + stellar AA + Barr makes 5% = BHO steals the state with just 47% dream.
• And SD moves from Lean McCain to Likely McCain as polls confirm.

In sum, I think that post-bounce, mid-Wall St crisis, pre-debates, Team Obama is well positioned in the battlegrounds with 260 EVs from Lean and Likely Obama states - just 10 EVs short of victory. Obama's negative object danger comes from Michigan and Pennsylvania (in that order) with his best positive object opportunies from the Toss-ups in CO, VA, NV and OH (in that order). Obama's further paths to victory include IN, FL and NC (in that order).

Thus, despite the loss of AK, GA, ND and SD from the playing field, the wisdom of the Obama campaign's expand-the-map strategy shines through this analysis: Obama continues to have simply far more paths to victory then McCain.

* = see: "head" not "heart".

MAR in the Imperial Capital

I'll be in DC for the next few days meeting (drinking) with lawyers, lobbyists and DNCers - will try to keep you posted on the campaign news from the Centre of All Conventional Wisdom via the reluctantly-embraced-but-now-much-adored delight that is Twitter:

http://twitter.com/vompolitik

Party ID and demographics on Nov 4: a battleground states tour (FL, GA, IN, MO, NC, SD)

Continuing with our tour of the party ID and likely demographic composition of the electorates in the battleground states come November 4 our attention now turns to those states that at the start of last week I classed as Lean McCain: Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Missouri, North Carolina and South Dakota.

To repeat, I'll be exploring the likely Party ID and key demographic changes in the electorate since the 2004 Presidential election. Also included, where it exists, is the 2006 exit poll data. Taken together there is a good comparison of the high and low watermarks for both parties with regard to ID and demographic breakdowns (2004 being the GOP sweep year and 2006 being the Democrats' Congressional sweep). Lastly, I've checked this information against the latest voter registration estimates in the battleground states.

The purpose of this model is to serve as a likely prediction of what the composition of the electorate on November 4th is actually likely to be. By so doing, we create a sanity check against polls which deviate wildly from these fairly conservative estimations of party ID and demographic change. Such an undertaking is of course fraught with all the dangers of multiple changed variable predictions so let me first state clearly the assumptions for my estimations:

Assumptions

• Higher African American turnout
• Higher Hispanic turnout
• Higher youth turnout
• GOP turnout at 2004 levels (although a GOP turnout estimate from a credible source would be appreciated)
• Increased Democratic Party ID from 2004
• Decreased Republican Party ID from 2004

Thus below I offer both the actual numbers for party ID and for internal polling demographics as recorded by the multi-network/newsagency exit polls of 2004 and 2006 respectively.

Party identification and polling demographics in FL, GA, IN, MO, NC and SD

Florida (27 electoral votes)
The 2004 network exit poll for Florida revealed the following demographic breakdown of the FL electorate:

Female: 54%
Male: 46%
White: 70% (estimated 2008 decrease: 68%)
African American: 12% (estimated 2008 increase: 14%)
Hispanic: 15%
Other: 3%
Ages:
Under 17%
31-64: 64% (estimated 2008 decrease: 63%)
Over 65: 19%

Party ID 2004:
Democratic: 37%
Republican: 41%
Independent: 23%

Party ID 2006:
Democratic: 36%
Republican: 39%
Independent: 25%

Party ID 2008 estimate:
Democratic: 41%
Republican: 39%
Independent: 20%

Like Ohio, the greatest challenge Obama faces is retaining Democratic loyalty. This, and McCain's staunch support from popular FL Governor Charlie Crist, will probably combine to keep the Sunshine state out of reach for Team Obama - although we'll be watching carefully for the Biden/Palin here.

Georgia (15 electoral votes)
The 2004 network exit poll for Georgia revealed the following demographic breakdown of the GA electorate:

Female: 56%
Male: 44%
White: 70%
African American: 25% (estimated 2008 increase: 28%)
Hispanic: 4%
Other: 2%
Ages:
Under 30: 19% (estimated 2008 increase: 21%)
31-64: 73% (estimated 2008 decrease: 70%)
Over 65: 8% (estimated 2008 increase: 9%)

Party ID 2004:
Democratic: 34%
Republican: 42%
Independent: 24%

No 2006 exit poll data is available.

Party ID 2008 estimate:
Democratic: 37%
Republican: 39%
Independent: 24%

As pollster Charles Bullock summarises: "For Obama to carry Georgia in November, multiple factors must come together. He will need to mobilize unprecedented levels of turnout among African Americans and young whites and hope that Bob Barr eats into John McCain’s support."

With the news that Obama has stopped advertising in Georgia and is withdrawing some ground staff it looks like Team Obama doesn't think the factors will indeed come together.

Indiana (11 electoral votes)
The 2004 network exit poll for Indiana revealed the following demographic breakdown of the IN electorate:

Female: 52%
Male: 48%
White: 89% (estimated 2008 decrease: 86%)
African American: 7% (estimated 2008 increase: 9%)
Hispanic: 3%
Other: 2%
Ages:
Under 30: 14% (estimated 2008 increase: 17%)
31-64: 74% (estimated 2008 decrease: 71%)
Over 65: 12%

Party ID 2004:
Democratic: 32%
Republican: 46%
Independent: 22%

No 2006 exit poll data is available.

Party ID 2008 estimate:
Democratic: 36%
Republican: 43%
Independent: 21%

As 538 notes, Indiana remains "a break-glass-in-case-of-emergency state" for Obama, "if it becomes a must-win, we are talking about a scenario where a candidate is facing third-and-long: not an uncovertable position by any means, but also not the one they'd prefer to be battling from."

That said, polls are still surprisingly close and it is interesting that Obama now has at least 26 field offices to McCain's zero. IN could yet be the big surprise of the election.

Missouri (11 electoral votes)
The 2004 network exit poll for Missouri revealed the following demographic breakdown of the MO electorate:

Female: 53%
Male: 47%
White: 89% (estimated 2008 decrease: 88%)
African American: 8% (estimated 2008 increase: 10%)
Hispanic: 1%
Other: 1%
Ages:
Under 30: 20%
31-64: 69% (estimated 2008 decrease: 63%)
Over 65: 11%

Party ID 2004:
Democratic: 35%
Republican: 36%
Independent: 29%

Party ID 2006:
Democratic: 37%
Republican: 39%
Independent: 29%

Party ID 2008 estimate:
Democratic: 36%
Republican: 36%
Independent: 28%

Missouri is probably much the same as Indiana, "a break-glass-in-case-of-emergency state", but is probably a lower chance for Obama then IN if polls are to be believed.

North Carolina (15 electoral votes)
The 2004 network exit poll for North Carolina was widely considered to be seriously flawed. Given that caveat, the following demographic breakdown of a 2008 estimate of the NC electorate is offered based on polling and demographic data:

Female: 54%
Male: 46%
White: 76%
African American: 21%
Hispanic: 2%
Other: 1%
Ages:
Under 30: 18%
31-64: 72%
Over 65: 10%

The 2004 exit poll data is too flawed to be used.

No 2006 exit poll data is available.

Party ID 2008 estimate (based on polling):
Democratic: 42%
Republican: 32%
Independent: 26%

NC has been the hidden ambition of Team Obama throughout the campaign. With a sizable African American population and positive broader demographic changes the state seems tailor-made for the Obama expand-the-map strategy. This is the one Lean McCain state that may yet shift to toss-up.

South Dakota (3 electoral votes)
The 2004 network exit poll for South Dakota revealed the following demographic breakdown of the SD electorate:

Female: 50%
Male: 50%
White: 95%
African American: 1% (estimated 2008 increase: 14%)
Hispanic: 0%
Other: 4%
Ages:
Under 30: 19%
31-64: 64% (estimated 2008 decrease: 63%)
Over 65: 17%

Party ID 2004:
Democratic: 32%
Republican: 47%
Independent: 21%

No 2006 exit poll data is available.

Party ID 2008 estimate:
Democratic: 35%
Republican: 45%
Independent: 20%

Alas, in the face of demographic and party ID analysis I must yield to the unlikelihood that SD is actually Lean McCain. I shall change this accordingly in my next battleground states update.

Conclusion: Between the likely demographics, the estimated party ID and the recent polling, I estimate the following breakdown of states:
Lean McCain: FL, IN, MO, NC
Likely McCain: GA, SD

I hope that this crystal ball gazing is of some utility to readers, particularly the next time some daft NC poll emerges showing a 10% African American composition or some such. All of these estimates will be under review throughout the remaining weeks so please offer comments and criticism as you see fit. Many thanks.

Party ID & demographics on Nov 4: a battleground states tour (CO, MI, MT, NV, NH, ND, OH, VA)

Continuing with our tour of the party ID and likely demographic composition of the electorates in the battleground states come November 4 our attention now turns to those states that at the start of last week I classed as toss-up: Colorado, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio and Virginia.

To repeat, I'll be exploring the likely Party ID and key demographic changes in the electorate since the 2004 Presidential election. Also included, where it exists, is the 2006 exit poll data. Taken together there is a good comparison of the high and low watermarks for both parties with regard to ID and demographic breakdowns (2004 being the GOP sweep year and 2006 being the Democrats' Congressional sweep). Lastly, I've checked this information against the latest voter registration estimates in the battleground states.

The purpose of this model is to serve as a likely prediction of what the composition of the electorate on November 4th is actually likely to be. By so doing, we create a sanity check against polls which deviate wildly from these fairly conservative estimations of party ID and demographic change. Such an undertaking is of course fraught with all the dangers of multiple changed variable predictions so let me first state clearly the assumptions for my estimations:

Assumptions

• Higher African American turnout
• Higher Hispanic turnout
• Higher youth turnout
• GOP turnout at 2004 levels (although a GOP turnout estimate from a credible source would be appreciated)
• Increased Democratic Party ID from 2004
• Decreased Republican Party ID from 2004

Thus below I offer both the actual numbers for party ID and for internal polling demographics as recorded by the multi-network/newsagency exit polls of 2004 and 2006 respectively.

Party identification and polling demographics in CO, MI, MT, NV, NH, ND, OH, VA

Colorado (9 electoral votes)
The 2004 network exit poll for Colorado revealed the following demographic breakdown of the CO electorate:

Female: 56%
Male: 44%
White: 86%
African American: 4%
Hispanic: 8% (estimated 2008 increase: 10%)
Other: 3%
Ages:
Under 30: 15% (estimated 2008 increase: 17%)
31-64: 69% (estimated 2008 increase: 67%)
Over 65: 16%

Since 2000, Colorado has seen impressive increases in the Hispanic population and in the Hispanic electorate (with the Hispanic population in the GOP stronghold of Colorado Springs growing since by over 40%!).

Party ID 2004:
Democratic: 29%
Republican: 38%
Independent: 33%

No exit poll data from the 2006 elections is available.

Party ID 2008 estimate:
Democratic: 35%
Republican: 37%
Independent: 28%

With the dramatic decline in registered Republicans in Colorado and an increase in registered Democrats as well as the Denver-based Democratic National Convention, a strong narrowing of the party ID gap in Colorado can be safely predicted.

Michigan (17 electoral votes)
The 2004 network exit poll for Michigan revealed the following demographic breakdown of the MI electorate:

Female: 51%
Male: 49%
White: 82%
African American: 13% (estimated 2008 increase: 14%)
Hispanic: 2%
Other: 3%
Ages:
Under 30: 21% (estimated 2008 increase: 22%)
31-64: 64% (estimated 2008 decrease: 63%)
Over 65: 15%

Party ID 2004:
Democratic: 39%
Republican: 34%
Independent: 27%

Party ID 2006:
Democratic: 40%
Republican: 33%
Independent: 27%

Party ID 2008 estimate:
Democratic: 38%
Republican: 34%
Independent: 28%

A slight decrease to Democratic ID to account for the State Democratic Party's problems of the last year.

Montana (3 electoral votes)
The 2004 network exit poll for Montana revealed the following demographic breakdown of the MT electorate:

Female: 49%
Male: 51%
White: 95%
African American: 2%
Hispanic: 1%
Other: 3% (estimated 2008 increase: 4%)
Ages:
Under 30: 21% (estimated 2008 increase: 22%)
31-64: 64% (estimated 2008 decrease: 63%)
Over 65: 15%

Party ID 2004:
Democratic: 32%
Republican: 39%
Independent: 29%

Party ID 2006:
Democratic: 32%
Republican: 39%
Independent: 29%

Party ID 2008 estimate:
Democratic: 36%
Republican: 38%
Independent: 26%

Despite the popular Democratic Governor Brian Schweitzer, and the Obama ground game advantage it looks like the Montana mountain may just be too steep to climb for Team Obamaafterall. This will be moved to Lean McCain in the next map update.

Nevada (5 electoral votes)
The 2004 network exit poll for Nevada revealed the following demographic breakdown of the NV electorate:

Female: 52%
Male: 48%
White: 77% (estimated 2008 decrease: 74%)
African American: 7% (estimated 2008 increase: 8%)
Hispanic: 10% (estimated 2008 increase: 12%)
Other: 6%
Ages:
Under 30: 16% (estimated 2008 increase: 18%)
31-64: 67% (estimated 2008 decrease: 65%)
Over 65: 17%

The Hispanic increase is easily justified by the Census-reported increase in the Hispanic population.

Party ID 2004:
Democratic: 35%
Republican: 39%
Independent: 26%

Party ID 2006:
Democratic: 33%
Republican: 40%
Independent: 27%

Party ID 2008 estimate:
Democratic: 39%
Republican: 36%
Independent: 25%

The party ID change is easily justified by the extraordinary transformation in the Nevada registered voter situation with Democrats moving from a 2004 position of 430k registered Dems set against 434k registered Republicans to a commanding 2008 position of 566k registered Dems to 490k registered Republicans.

New Hampshire (4 electoral votes)
The 2004 network exit poll for New Hampshire revealed the following demographic breakdown of the NH electorate:

Female: 49% (estimated 2008 increase: 50%)
Male: 51% (estimated 2008 decrease: 50%)
White: 95%
African American: 1%
Hispanic: 1%
Other: 2%
Ages:
Under 30: 16% (estimated 2008 increase: 17%)
31-64: 73% (estimated 2008 decrease: 70%)
Over 65: 11% (estimated 2008 increase: 13%)

While youth increases to the benefit of Obama, I predict older voter turnout will also increase to the benefit of McCain.

Party ID 2004:
Democratic: 25%
Republican: 32%
Independent: 44%

No exit poll data for 2006 is available.

Party ID 2008 estimate:
Democratic: 29%
Republican: 31%
Independent: 40%

Again, the dramatic increase in registered Democrats assures a strong narrowing of the GOP ID advantage. In sum, McCain can play at competeing in his beloved NH all he wants, the voters just aren't there for him anymore.

North Dakota (3 electoral votes)
The 2004 network exit poll for North Dakota revealed the following demographic breakdown of the ND electorate:

Female: 51%
Male: 49%
White: 98%
African American: 0%
Hispanic: 1%
Other: 1%
Ages:
Under 30: 20%
31-64: 65%
Over 65: 15%

Party ID 2004:
Democratic: 27%
Republican: 41%
Independent: 32%

Party ID 2006:
Democratic: 29%
Republican: 38%
Independent: 33%

Party ID 2008 estimate:
Democratic: 32%
Republican: 38%
Independent: 30%

Despite Team Obama's hopes and dreams of flipping ND off the back of their strong primary season performance it looks like North Dakota like its neighbour is also too steep a climb. This will be moved to Lean McCain in the next map update.

Ohio (20 electoral votes)
The 2004 network exit poll for Ohio revealed the following demographic breakdown of the OH electorate:

Female: 53%
Male: 47%
White: 86% (estimated 2008 decrease: 84%)
African American: 10% (estimated 2008 increase: 12%)
Hispanic: 3%
Other: 2%
Ages:
Under 30: 21%
31-64: 67%
Over 65: 12%

Party ID 2004:
Democratic: 35%
Republican: 40%
Independent: 25%

Party ID 2006:
Democratic: 40%
Republican: 37%
Independent: 23%

Party ID 2008 estimate:
Democratic: 41%
Republican: 35%
Independent: 24%

The host of recent Ohio polling seems to confirm that self-identifying Democrats are willing to break with party and vote for McCain in sizable numbers. As such, the crucial number in the Buckeye state will not be the party ID divide but rather the party loyalty number (namely that percentage of declared Dems who wil actually vote for the Democratic Candidate).

I'll be exploring my old battleground turf of Ohio in great detail in subsequent postings.

Virginia (13 electoral votes)
The 2004 network exit poll for Virginia revealed the following demographic breakdown of the VA electorate:

Female: 54%
Male: 46%
White: 72% (estimated 2008 decrease: 71%)
African American: 21% (estimated 2008 increase: 22%)
Hispanic: 3%
Other: 4%
Ages:
Under 30: 17% (estimated 2008 increase: 18%)
31-64: 73% (estimated 2008 increase: 72%)
Over 65: 10%

Party ID 2004:
Democratic: 39%
Republican: 35%
Independent: 26%

Party ID 2006:
Democratic: 36%
Republican: 39%
Independent: 26%

Party ID 2008 estimate:
Democratic: 38%
Republican: 37%
Independent: 25%

The latest Survey USA crosstabs (the gold standard of VA polling) reveal just how fertile the ground of the Old Dominion is for Team Obama: their model is more male, more white and older then my projection and yet they still have Obama wining the state by 4%. On the downside, their poll is overly generous to Obama in terms of party ID and GOP defectors. The Field offers good commentary on the unfolding VA adventure story.

Ultimately, the trench warfare of the ground game will be determinative and that's why with 28 field offices to McCain's 6 I predict, VA to be advantage Obama.

Conclusion: Between the scale of Obama's ground game in these states, the positive shifts in party ID even under conservative projections and the conservative demographic increases for youth and minority turnout, I estimate the following breakdown of states:
Obama: CO, MI, NV, NH, VA
McCain: MT, ND
Total coin toss: OH

Next up, the Lean McCain states.

Omaha's 1 electoral vote: a plea from the bitter watches of the night...

Last night, I dreamed of a Survey USA poll of Nebraska's 2nd Congressional District. It had a sample size of 1,014 and had been conducted just for me and my blog. Alas, just before I was about to pour over the crosstabs I was wrenched back into the harsh reality of a world in which individual electoral vote districts fail to get the attention they so richly deserve.

Why the (now even nocturnal) fixation? Well, as mentioned repeatedly by myself, Chuck Todd and Marc Ambinder, Nebraska (which divides it's electoral votes) has the greater Omaha area Congressional District (NE-CD2) which should be very much in play. Alas, as First Read notes: "Has anyone seen any data out of that Omaha congressional district?"

The last attempt at a poll to my knowledge was Survey USA in May, who's internals' breakdown of the Congressional Districts of Nebraska left much to be desired.

Herewith I repeat yesterday's plea for any information on NE-2: from voter registration numbers to number of Obama and McCain field offices to local paper focus groups - heavens, even local paper focus groups would at least cast a slim candle of light on this darkness of data.

So if you have something decent on the state of the race in NE-2, PLEASE contact me. Rewards range from heartfelt gratitude to the possibility of a genuine shiny sixpence.

Thank you!

Yours,
(electorally-electroencephalogram-inclined)
Marcus

Party ID & demographics on Nov 4: a battleground states tour (WI, NM, NE2, PA)

My Q&A a few posts ago left two vital questions hanging: what is the current state of party ID and what are the demographics of the electorate likely to be on November 4th?

Begining with those states I consider to be Leaning Obama (Wisconsin, New Mexico, Nebraska Congressional District 2 and Pennsylvania) I'll now explore likely Party ID and key demographic changes in the electorate since the 2004 Presidential election. Also included is the 2006 exit poll data. Taken together there is a good comparison of the high and low watermarks for both parties with regard to ID and demographic breakdowns (2004 being the GOP sweep year and 2006 being the Democrats' Congressional sweep). Lastly, I've checked this information against the latest voter registration estimates in the battleground states.

The purpose of this model is to serve as a likely prediction of what the composition of the electorate on November 4th is actually likely to be. By so doing, we create a sanity check against polls which deviate wildly from these fairly conservative estimations of party ID and demographic change. Such an undertaking is of course fraught with all the dangers of multiple changed variable predictions so let me first state clearly the assumptions for my estimations:

Assumptions

• Higher African American turnout
• Higher Hispanic turnout
• Higher youth turnout
• GOP turnout at 2004 levels (although a GOP turnout estimate from a credible source would be appreciated)
• Increased Democratic Party ID from 2004
• Decreased Republican Party ID from 2004

Thus below I offer both the actual numbers for party ID and for internal polling demographics as recorded by the multi-network/newsagency exit polls of 2004 and 2006 respectively.

Party identification and polling demographics in WI, NM, NE-2 and PA

Wisconsin (10 electoral votes)
The 2004 network exit poll for Wisconsin revealed the following demographic breakdown of the WI electorate:

Female: 53%
Male: 47%
White: 90%/89%
African American: 5% (estimated 2008 increase: 6%)
Hispanic: 2%
Other: 3%
Ages:
Under 30: 20% (estimated 2008 increase: 21%)
31-64: 66% (estimated 2008 decrease: 65%)
Over 65: 14%

Party ID 2004:
Democratic: 35%
Republican: 38%
Independent: 27%

Party ID 2006:
Democratic: 39%
Republican: 34%
Independent: 27%

Party ID 2008 estimate:
Democratic: 39%
Republican: 34%
Independent: 27%

New Mexico (5 EVs)
The 2004 network exit poll for New Mexico revealed the following demographic breakdown of the NM electorate:
Female: 55%
Male: 45%
White: 57%/54%
African American: 2%
Hispanic: 32% (estimated 2008 increase: 35%)
Other: 9%
Ages:
Under 30: 17% (estimated 2008 increase: 19%)
31-64: 66% (estimated 2008 decrease: 64%)
Over 65: 17%

Party ID 2004:
Democratic: 40%
Republican: 33%
Independent: 27%

Party ID 2006:
Democratic: 41%
Republican: 32%
Independent: 27%

Party ID 2008 estimate:
Democratic: 42%
Republican: 32%
Independent: 26%

Nebraska Congressional District 2 (Omaha) (1 EV)
No exit poll or party ID information exists for NE-2 from 2004 and there is a lack of reliable polling at present to engage in a decent analysis. As soon as credible polling emerges (e.g. Survey USA) I shall both post anew as well as update this post. In the meantime, I strongly urge anyone with NE-2 data to send it to me please!

Pennsylvania (21)
The 2004 network exit poll for Pennsylvania revealed the following demographic breakdown of the PA electorate:

Female: 53%
Male: 47%
White: 82%
African American: 13%
Hispanic: 3%
Other: 2%
Ages:
Under 30: 21%
31-64: 65%
Over 65: 14%

Note: Such was the success of the Kerry campaign in Pennsylvania then as of this time, no clear opportunities for demographic change in PA appear to exist.

Party ID 2004:
Democratic: 41%
Republican: 39%
Independent: 20%

Party ID 2006:
Democratic: 43%
Republican: 38%
Independent: 19%

Party ID 2008 estimate:
Democratic: 42%
Republican: 38%
Independent: 20%

Conclusion: Between the scale of Obama's ground game in these states, the positive shifts in party ID even under conservative projections and the conservative demographic increases for youth and minority turnout, I estimate these states to all break for Obama by larger margins on election day then polls currently project.

Next up, the toss-up states.

An afternoon in a UES bookshop is a dangerous thing...

I have just returned from one of my beloved book-buying expeditions with Christie (who's excellent blog thegirlswhoateeverything I commend to all epicurists and oenophiles) where I purchased the following spectrum of books:

I) The world as I should like it to be:
Audio versions of 'Dreams from my Father' & 'The Audacity of Hope' and the new Obama policy book'Change we can believe in'

II) The world as it is:
Woodward's latest must-read 'The War Within' and Robert Harris' enjoyable roman a clef nonsense novel about The-CIA-plot-behind-Tony-Blair's-memoirs, 'The Ghost'

III) The world after a McCain/Palin Adminstration
'Planetkill'

So armed, I shall now dive back into the realm of politik, thank you for your patience.

FAS's Counterfactual: How HRC Could Have Pulled It Off

Two months ago Marcus and our mutual friend Jonny Cristol asked me two grisly questions: who amongst the possible Republican VP choices frightened me most, and, were I an HRC or McCain operative, how would I have set about beating Barack Obama? My answer to the first was Bobby Jindal and Sarah Palin (Colin Powell never having been on any serious list). My answer to the second was closely tied to my answer to the first: Jindal and even Palin indicate the course of action through which HRC stood the best chance of beating Obama, and how McCain can still make his last, best run at victory: wresting the Change mantle from the Democratic nominee.

Three caveats before the argument. The first is that wresting Change from Obama was always going to be a Herculean task, because Obama not only preaches Change but actually embodies it – a white, middle-aged politician can talk about Change, but a young, African-American pol can actually be Change. The second is that both the HRC counterfactual and hypothetical McCain attack assume basic competence on the part of both their campaigns, which may be the farthest-fetched assumption I'll make in a long series of them. The third is simply to say that I do not wish any of what I am about to say had happened or will happen.

Let us begin with a counterfactual in the case of HRC. In late 2006, Hillary Clinton was sitting on head-starts in funding and polling – a post-Senate-run war chest of $10 million and a 22% lead over Obama in the horse-race question. The critical point, however, is in Obama's
numbers and the whacking 33% had no opinion at all.

This was the period of greatest danger and opportunity for both candidates. Simply put, his brand was up for grabs. Meanwhile, HRC was a universally known quantity. Both candidates had a choice: be the Change candidate, or be the Establishment candidate. It should
have been (and I'm sure at some level was) patently obvious to both that 2008 was going to be a Change year, perhaps THE Change year – 'Four More Years' would not be the winning rallying-cry this time around (as opposed to in 1988, when G.H.W. Bush effectively ran for
Reagan's third term).

The choice for Obama was obvious. For him to run in the Democratic primary as the Establishment candidate would have been ludicrous – he'd been in Washington for two years at that point, and his personal narrative was not exactly an Ode to the System. HRC, meanwhile, was a more likely candidate for the Establishment slot, based on her longer record in politics; indeed, positioning herself as the Change candidate would have required something of a re-brand, and would have meant fighting the dynamic Obama on his own turf. This is one of the
odd points about Change elections – not having name recognition is actually an advantage, because you can brand yourself however you need to (assuming you have the money to promote your brand, which Obama certainly did after Q1 of 2007). Name-recognition, so crucial in
Establishment elections, becomes a bit of a drag, because re-branding is harder than branding – you not only have to persuade people of something, but you must persuade them of something that conflicts with what they previously believed. That said, HRC positioning herself as the Establishment candidate meant being out-of-step with the electorate – and $10 million gives you a great head-start on rebranding.

HRC was faced with a judgment call: fight Obama for the Change mantle, or be the Establishment candidate in a Change year. She chose to be the Establishment candidate, Obama chose Change, and the rest is history.

It didn't have to be this way. Had HRC chosen to fight for the Change mantle, it would certainly have been an uphill battle, but she could have made a go at it, based on two strategies: bear-hug Obama to death, co-opting Change for herself, or, in classic Clintonian triangulation, attack Obama for not actually representing change.

Option 1: the Bear-Hug

A) Use the $10 million megaphone to get the words "Clinton" and "Change" associated: "Clinton: Change is on the Way" (to co-opt from Kerry) or some such. Again, $10 million buys a lot of media points.
B) Praise the dynamic young Senator who will of course
have a key role in the HRC Administration.

Option 2: Strangle the Obama campaign in the crib

A) Attack Obama as "more of the same". Selling Barack Obama as more-of-same is a very tough sell, but if John Kerry can be publicly framed as a coward and imposter to military honors than anyone's reputation is up for grabs. The best start would have been an ad campaign assaulting Obama's many 'present' votes in the Illinois State Senate – an examination shows them to have been perfectly reasonable (and imminently defensible), but presented as

"Barack Obama is just another do-nothing politician. He voted 'present' on over 50 bills, including important legislation on abortion, juvenile crime, and sex crimes. That's right. He was in the State Capitol. He was on the floor. He just didn't take a stand. Instead, he just punched in, collected his paycheck, and left. Barack Obama – present but unaccounted-for",

they take on a more sinister light, especially if that was the first thing you'd ever heard about Obama.

A campaign this aggressive would have driven up Clinton's unfavorables somewhat, but keep in mind the 22% lead and 3% no-opinion factor - a strong negative campaign on Clinton's part would have caused those who disliked her to dislike her more, and would certainly have turned off the 3% no-opinion crowd - a very small price to pay in order to cap the persuasion-universe (the 'no-opinions') of your up-and-coming opponent and destroy his brand before he can even establish it.

Obama would have naturally countered any of this with an "I am more Change than she is" argument, but he would have been stuck trying to establish a difference of degrees rather than drawing a shocking and sharp contrast, and been on the defensive about his record in the Illinois State Senate. This all would have tested his commitment to a new kind of politics.

Of course, HRC didn't do any of this. She took the Establishment mantle and wore it proudly while Obama claimed Change. HRC eventually came around to trying to make hay out of the 'present' votes, but this was December 2007, by which time Obama was already pulling away in
Iowa. She also came around on the Change mantle, but that meant trying a re-brand in the midst of a heated election after having ceded the title to the most dynamic politician of his generation.

That's an all-but-impossible task, and John McCain should know. He appears to be trying it right now, which brings us to Why Sarah Palin Isn't Change We Can Believe In.

FAS's brief history of Change versus Experience

My thanks to Marcus for inviting me to add a bit to this blog; it's great to be here. This post will be in a few parts, and deals directly with the question of what is the Center of Gravity in this election, a subject still very much up for discussion.


National campaigns are about Change v. Experience/Establishment. This is particularly true of presidential campaigns. Change or Establishment is the dominant narrative of any campaign – either you represent a break from the way things are, or you are more of the same. The narrative must be backed up by the appropriate set of policies, of course (as John McCain may well soon discover), but the essential policies of Democratic and Republican candidates haven't changed significantly since the 1960s and 1970s – Dems in favor of a higher tax burden on the wealthy, increased government spending on social programs, soft power abroad, and regulation for the social good (clean air standards, for example). Republicans have been low taxes for the wealthy, less government spending, hard power, and deregulation (except in a few key areas to do with 'moral values').

There have been alterations, of course, on a campaign-by-campaign basis – the addition of universal health care to the standard Dem candidate platform was this year's big new thing - but the party brands have been around for at least thirty years. And during that time there have been three Democratic presidential terms and five Republican – hardly a clear indication that the voters strongly prefer one set of policies to another, particularly as, counting from 1976
(the first post-1968 incarnation of both Parties), presidential terms went Carter-Reagan-Reagan-Bush-Clinton-Clinton-Bush-Bush.

The difference is the voters' appetite for Change. The calculus here is a hard one. Economic factors play a role (1992), but not always (the campaign cycle of 1999-2000 was at the end of eight years of prosperity, but 2000 was a Change election and Gore never seized the
Change mantle). National security can be the issue (2002, a midterm, was, I would argue, that greatest incarnation of an Establishment Election – 'vote with the Administration or something terrible will happen', a message tried less successfully in 2006, a Change year). 1980 was a Change year, but four years after Morning in America, Reagan had become Establishment, and voters still wanted more (1988). Neither party has a lock on Change (Carter, Reagan, Clinton, and GW Bush were Change candidates), or Establishment (the same cast all ran
as Establishment candidates, as did GHW Bush).

It is up to the candidate and Campaign to gauge whether an election is a Change year or an Establishment year, and to brand accordingly. Pick the former, and your constant mantra is 'change', said as often as the candidate's name (preferably more often). Play down the candidate's existing record, and talk about the future. Pick the latter, and your words are 'experienced', 'tested', etc. Play up the record, and talk about past successes – your candidate has been there before. Pick wrong, and the best candidate does NOT win (think 2000 – Supreme Court or not, the result was close enough to be adjudicated not because Bush was Gore's equal, but because he was the Change voters wanted).

More later. I leave you with this, from David Plouffe:
“John McCain jettisoned his message and his strategy. It is now about change. We’re going to lean into that very, very hard.”